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The demand for allocations and assignments in the radio frequency spec-
trum continues to grow in the United States and internationally. The unique
properties of the spectrum combined with this growing demand have created
a significant managment challenge for the Federal Goverment. As a principal
user of the spectrum, the military services are especially dependent upon the
national spectrum management processes. Effective command and control of
forces and optimum use of electronic sensory, navigation, and weapons sys-
tems are all contingent upon the ability to utilize the radio frequency spectrum.
It is the responsibility of the national spectrum management process to
encourage maximum utilization of the spectrum while maintaining
electromagnetic compatibility. The importance of the spectrum to the military
makes it imperative that the services develop a comprehensive strategy to
protect the resources they currently have and help them to compete success-
fully for future requirements. This strategy must involve the development of
clear national policy objectives relating to the spectrum, must contain guid-
ance for improving the utilization of existing assignments, and must provide
direction to new technologies.
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I. THE ELECTOMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
While it has been just over one century since Heinrich Hertz discovered
electromagnetic radiation (1887), it seems unlikely that even the most
prescient of his generation could have predicted the degree to which all na-
tions have become dependent upon the electromagnetic spectrum. In the
United States we rely on electromagnetic waves for everything from remotely
opening a garage door to communicating with our strategic military forces
abroad. There is a seemingly endless number of applications using the spec-
trum, and to exploit them one must possess a knowledge of just what the
spectrum is and what restrictions exist regarding its use.
A. PROPERTIES OF THE SPECTRUM
Even the most basic concepts involved in understanding how
electromagnetic waves propagate tend to conjure up something mystical. This
thesis is not designed to explain the theories of Maxwell. Hertz, or any of the
other pioneers in the field of electromagnetics. What is necessary, though, is
a clear understanding of what the spectrum can support in terms of communi-
cations and information transfer.
It has long been understood that the spectrum is unique among natural
resources. These differences have resulted in much of the pressure to regu-
late the spectrum. Some principles that apply are
• The spectrum is limited, both in terms of the technology we have to exploit
it and the associated economic factors.
• The spectrum is inelastic. This resource has dimensions of time, space
and frequency. No two similar signals can occupy the same geographic
space at the same time without creating interference. Each signal must
use these dimensions differently to establish a clear path from the trans-
mitter to the receiver.
• The radio frequency spectrum does not recognize national boundaries
nor regulatory edicts. This means that at both the national and the inter-
national level there must be a substantial degree of coordination and co-
operation to limit interference.
• The spectrum is free. While there are costs associated with the regulatory
processes that govern use of the spectrum, the United States has long
recognized the spectrum as a public resource to be shared by those with
a legitimate need who are willing to abide by all regulatory guidelines.
This has been one factor in increasing demand from both the Government
and the private sector, but it has also reduced the motivation to achieve
more efficient, high-value uses for the spectrum.
• The spectrum is not exhausted through use. [Ref. 1: pp. A-4 - A-7]
In an effort to establish some descriptors for the spectrum that are useful
in working with it, waves are typically described in terms of frequency and
wavelength. The radio frequency spectrum, just one portion of the entire
electromagnetic spectrum, ranges in frequencies from a few thousand cycles
per second (Kilohertz) to 400 billion cycles per second (Gigahertz). The cur-
rent allocation table for the United States covers from nine kilohertz (wave-
length of approximately 33.31 kilometers) to 300 gigahertz (wavelength of
approximately 1 millimeter). These different frequencies and their associated
wavelengths possess different propagation characteristics, and for ease of
classification frequencies are grouped in ranges where similar characteristics
apply. These characteristics also determine what applications can be effec-
tively implemented in certain regions of the spectrum. Table 1 shows the
common frequency bands with some of the applications they support.
B. THE NEED FOR SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
The evaluation of any communication requirement should include the eco-
nomic and technical concerns as well as the desired propagation character-
istics in deciding where to operate within the usable spectrum. Translated into
more practical language, this means that the demand for spectrum resources
will never be uniformly distributed across the 300 billion different integer fre-
quencies available in the allocated spectrum. Crowding occurs when many
users desire to operate within a small portion of the spectrum. In spite of the
sheer size of the spectrum, this has become a very real problem. In the
mid-1970's. virtually all of the practical applications were utilizing only one and
one-third percent of the allocated radio frequency spectrum. Experimental
work accounted for work in roughly ten percent of the remaining spectrum.
Table 1. RADIO FREQUENCY BANDS
Preaue^c^es Sand Typical Uses
30-300 GHz Extremely High Frequencies
(EHF)
Microwave relay; space re-
search; radar;
radionavigation






































3-30 Khz Very Low Frequencies (VLF) Very long-range point-point
communication





KHz - Kilohertz (thousands of cycles per second]
MHz - Megahertz (millions of cycles per second)
GHz - Gigahertz (billions of cycles per second)
Thus, nearly 90 percent of the allocated spectrum was unused [Ref. 1: p. A-4].
This underscores the concept that the usable spectrum is very different from
the radio frequency spectrum. There are two ways to effectively deal with the
problems of crowding:
• Utilizing advances in technology we can increase the size of the usable
spectrum.
• By regulating the use of the spectrum, we can limit interference.
Historically users have depended heavily on both, but have relied on advanc-
ing technology to limit the need for greater regulation. In practice, they must
be considered as complementary means of better managing the spectrum.
C. THE GOALS OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
While the need to regulate the spectrum is widely accepted, the objectives
and processes are less easily defined. They must be derived from national
goals and objectives that are supported directly or indirectly by the spectrum.
In the mid-1970's the Office of Telecommunications Policy stated the national
objectives for the use of the spectrum were
• to enhance the conduct of foreign affairs
• to serve the national security and defense
• to safeguard life and property
• to support crime prevention and law enforcement
• to support the national and international transportation system
• to foster the conservation of national resources
• to provide for the national and international dissemination of educational,
general, and public interest information and entertainment
• to make available rapid, efficient, nationwide and worldwide
radiocommunication services
• to stimulate social progress
• to improve the well being of man. [Ref. 1: pp. D-11 - D-12]
These same objectives appear in the current manual of regulations and pro-
cedures that govern spectrum management [Ref. 2]. They must be translated
into a second set of objectives that can be applied to manage the radio
frequency spectrum. This is a difficult task, but over time, the prime objectives
of centralized frequency management have evolved into maximizing the use
of the spectrum, minimizing the interference in its use. and maximizing
information through a channel per unit time.
D. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
The problem that presents itself is best summed up by author Harvey
Levin, who wrote.
"Maximum use" or "full occupancy" as such may run directly counter to the min-
imization of interference, which is best achieved, technically, through no use at
all. [Ref. 3: p. 65]
This inherent problem of balancing opposing objectives proves to be the basis
for most of our modern regulation. The question that arises is, "What activities
and processes will be needed to achieve this balance?"
In general terms, the management of the spectrum encompasses three
basic tasks: allocation, allotment, and assignment. The National Telecommu-
nications and Information Administration defines these to be:
• Allocation - Entry in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a frequency
band for the purpose of its use by one or more radiocommunications
services. This does not imply any specific user, only those services that
a-e authorized within a band.
• Allotment - Entry of a designated frequency channel in an agreed plan,
adopted by a component Conference, for use by one or more adminis-
trations for a radiocommunication service in one or more geographic re-
gions. Thus, allotments are used to identify the allocated services that
apply to a given band in some geographic area.
• Assignment - Authorization given by an administration for a radio station
to use a given frequency or frequency channel. This implies that the user
has some property rights or control over the frequency to the exclusion
of others. [Ref. 2: p. 6-2]
A fourth term that is often used when discussing spectrum management is
apportionment. This is used typically to describe the division of spectrum be-
tween the government and the private sector.
Now that there is a good understanding of what management tasks the
"regulator" is responsible for. an investigation of how these decisions are
made can begin. Clearly structure has an impact on these decisions, and the
structure of the Federal Government's regulatory bodies will be addressed in
Chapter Four. For the purposes of this chapter, the criteria that the regulatory
bodies are required or obliged to use in the execution of their duties will only
be briefly identified.
E. NATIONAL PHILOSPHY
The foundation of the basic philosophy that guides national spectrum
management is located in the Communications Act of 1934. One of the prin-
ciple reasons this law was enacted was to
make available, as far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient. Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio comnnunication service, with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of promoting safety of
life and property through the use of wire and radio communication [Ref. 4].
This has come to be known as the concept of universal service, and has been
a major force behind much of our current telecommunications policy and reg-
ulation. As a decision criterion, however, it is fundamentally flawed. In a
country where the private sector is responsible for most of the communication
systems used by the public, it fails to recognize the significance that economic
factors will have on the providers of these services. In many cases, the idea
of universal service at reasonable charges may be contrary to existing tech-
nology and procedures: and, even if not, these concepts are imprecise and
open to wide interpretation.
A second basic mandate of the Act was that any spectrum management
decision, whether related to allocation, allotment or assignment must be
weighed as to the "public interest, convenience or necessity." This standard,
nebulous language tends to create more questions than it answers. When this
phrase was included in previous legislation (1927), the responsible regulatory
agency was soundly criticized for not issuing a precise definition. As time has
passed, subsequent legislation, regulation, and litigation have all served to
continually redefine what the public interest is and how it can best be served
[Ref. 5: pp. 43-44].
F. RESEARCH AREA
This thesis will look at the structure and processes involved in spectrum
management in the United States to answer the following questions
• How effective is the Federal Government at management of the spectrum?
We will look at the historical development of national spectrum manage-
ment and the current regulatory environment. While the focus of this re-
search will be on the national level, certainly the very nature of the
spectrum demands that international considerations be addressed to
some extent. They will be included to show how important developments
on the international scene influenced national policy and regulation.
• What alternative regulatory schemes exist? Even if the Government does
a good job, there is the inherent assumption in a market economy that a
more efficient distribution of goods occurs when market forces are al-
lowed to determine that distribution. In the United States, the Govern-
ment s role and responsibility in regulating resources is always being
reexamined.
• What does technology hold for the spectrum? While technology has been
a significant factor in opening up more of the spectrum, these changes
have also served to increase demand. We must assess the state of tech-
nology and how it supports the national goals and objectives to determine
whether technology will continue to let us use the spectrum more effi-
ciently.
• Lastly, what management strategy will best assist the Armed Forces at the
national level in obtaining and retaining the spectrum resources required
to support our forces and our commitments? This will require an assess-
ment of the forces that exert the most influence on spectrum management
processes, to determine if there is pressure to bring about change in the
status quo.
Additionally there will be some consideration of the international forces that
impact on our national spectrum management processes. All of this must re-
sult in a determination as to what policies and positions the Armed Forces can
adopt to best defend their interests.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Once Marconi had received a patent for the radiotelegraph in 1896 and
had tested it successfully, it was evident that radio communication would be-
come a necessity in the maritime environment. The United States immediately
began to equip naval ships and to construct shore stations. In 1904, the Board
on Wireless Telegraphy reported to President Roosevelt that 24 ships were
equipped with radiotelegraph and that ten more ships were in the process of
being outfitted. Over thirty coast stations were operating with an eventual total
of 200 afloat and on-shore stations planned [Ref. 5: p. 6]. It is ironic that, while
the Federal Government quickly recognized the importance of radio, there was
a total lack of initiative to regulate or control the radio frequency spectrum.
B. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
The First International Radio Conference was held in Berlin in 1903. At the
time, the pressing concern to the attendees was how to eliminate the control
that the Marconi Company had on international communication.
Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the German Kaiser, was returning to
Germany, in the S.S. Deutschland, after a visit to the United States. Soon after
sailing, he desired to send President Roosevelt a radio message thanking him for
the numerous honors and courtesies which had been accorded him. The
Deutschland transmitted this message to the Marconi station at Nantucket, but
that station refused to accept it because the ship was fitted with Slaby-Arco radio
equipment. The irate Prince brought the matter to the attention of his brother.
Kaiser Wilhelm thereupon instructed his government to initiate action in an at-
tempt to establish international control over radio communication [Ref. 6 : p. 71].
That action resulted in the initial 1903 conference. Nine countries were re-
presented, and although no complete agreement was reached, a protocol was
drafted to serve as the basis for future international agreement. All of the de-
legates to the conference returned home having agreed to submit the protocol
to their respective governments for examination [Ref. 5; p. 7]. The inability to
agree upon a convention resulted from reservations by Great Britain and Italy,
the two countries where Marconi's interests were the strongest [Ret. 7: p. 17].
A second International Radio Conference met in Berlin in 1906. This was
attended by a total of 28 countries, including all nine nations involved in the
initial conference. The Convention that was adopted marked the beginning of
international regulation of the radio frequency spectrum. Major provisions of
the convention were
• The requirement for acceptance of messages by all coastal stations
and ships regardless of equipment used.
• Priority for distress calls from ships.
• Establishment of an International Bureau to gather information about
systems in use and coastal stations.
• Establishment of tariffs for international radio communications.
• 500 KHz and 1000 KHz were estabished as common calling frequencies.
[Ref. 5: pp. 7-8]
These new provisions went into effect in 1908 with the exception of the
United States which failed to ratify the convention until 1912. The ratification
hearings had begun before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
January 1908. One of the key opponents to the convention was none other
than former Attorney General John W. Griggs, who was then the president of
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America [Ref. 6: p. 124]. Although
the convention was shelved by Senate Republicans, it was eventually ratified
when the United States invitation to the 1912 International Radio Conference
was withdrawn by a vote of the other adhering countries. Upon ratification, the
invitation was again extended [Ref. 5: p. 9].
Domestic regulation of radio communication and of the radio frequency
spectrum began in 1910 with the passage of the Wireless Ship Act. This re-
quired passenger vessels (greater than 50 passengers) to have wireless
equipment installed and trained operators on board. The Secretary of Com-
merce was the administrator of the new law. since he was already responsible
for domestic maritime law [Ref. 8: p. 4].
The first comprehensive legislation to address radio communication was
the Radio Act of 1912. It required all radio stations to obtain a license from the
Secretary of Commerce in order to operate. The act was very specific and left
the Secretary with no discretionary authority. His function was to minimize
interference among stations. The Act did, however, allocate specific frequency
bands for government and commercial use. Frequencies above 1500 KHz (the
upper end of the AM broadcast band) were allocated to amateur operators as
they were considered of little practical use [Ref. 5: p. 10].
C. THE RADIO ACT OF 1927
As time passed in the 1920's, it was apparent that the guidelines of the
Radio Act of 1912 were inadequate to effectively manage the radio frequency
spectrum. This resulted from significant improvements in technology (the in-
vention of the vacuum tube) and from changes in the private sector (the for-
mation of the Radio Corporation of America). In response to these rapid
changes, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover created the interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) in June 1922. The purpose of the IRAC was
to assist in the assignment of frequencies to government users [Ref. 8: p. 9].
In the winter of 1922 the First National Radio Conference was convened to
bring together government, manufacturers and broadcasters. Everyone
agreed that the government needed to formulate a structured radio policy.
The conference declared that "radio should be regulated and controlled by the
Federal Government " [Ref. 8: p. 8].
The rapid changes occurring in the broadcast industry created significant
concerns in the Congress that new legislation was needed. The three main
concerns that they expressed were
• The issue of vested rights in the radio frequency spectrum.
• The criteria for the granting of radio station licenses.
• The fear of monopoly in the radio equipment market. [Ref. 5: p. 21]
Out of these concerns the Radio Act of 1927 was born. It created a five man
Federal Radio Commission (FRC). whose first chairman was Admiral W. H. G.
Bullard, USN (Retired). The FRC had been given the authority to grant, renew
and revoke radio station licenses [Ref. 8: p. 12]. While not nearly as expansive
as the government's current authority, it marked a significant increase in gov-
ernment regulation of the broadcast industry.
In addition to the establishment of the FRC, the Act required the President
to assign all government frequencies. This further enhanced the role of the
IRAC as an advisor to the President. In 1928 the FRC requested, and was
granted, permission to attend IRAC meetings. This marked the beginning of
cooperative efforts to resolve frequency allocation problems between the gov-
ernment and the private sector [Ref. 8: p. 13].
During this same time, there was increased pressure for international reg-
ulation of the spectrum as well. The first true Table of Frequency Allocation
was adopted at the Washington Radio Conference in 1927 by the delegates of
the 79 nations attending. The table adopted had actually been developed by
the five allied powers as a part of their preparations for the Treaty of Versailles
[Ref. 1: p. B-3].
D. THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 was an indication that, in the
wake of the economic collapse of 1929, the country desired stronger, more
centralized leadership. In addition, there was a keen interest in improving
accountability within the Executive Branch [Ref. 8: p. 14]. It was against this
backdrop that, in 1933. the Secretary of Commerce appointed an Interdepart-
ment Execution Committee to conduct a study of telecommunications man-
agement in America. In January 1934, study chairman Daniel Roper presented
the group's findings to the Senate Commerce Committee. At the same time,
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee had instructed Dr. W.
W. Splawn to conduct a similar study. Both the Roper and Splawn reports
were highly critical of how the authority and responsiblity over radio and the
spectrum had been dispersed among different committees and agencies [Ref.
8: p. 15].
These two reports provided the momentum needed for Congress to pass
the Communications Act of 1934. The most important part of this legislation
was the creation of the seven man Federal Communications Commission, with
expansive regulatory powers [Ref. 7: p. 21]. The FCC superceded the Federal
Radio Commission, and assumed authority over both radio licenses and the
telephone and telegraph industries. The IRAC retained its responsibility as
the pricipal advisory body to the President regarding the allocation of fre-
quencies to government users. The role of the President was envisioned as
one of support. No agency or committee was created to coordinate research
and development in telecommunications, to oversee the use of the spectrum,
or to serve as the focus of Executive Branch interest in communications [Ref.
9: p. 9-5].
The period from 1934-1940 served as a time to clarify roles and responsi-
bilities between the FCC and the IRAC. In late 1940 an agreement was signed
stating
The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee will cooperate with the FCC in
giving notice of all proposed actions which would tend to cause interference to
non-government station operation, and the Federal Communications Commission
(will do the same with the IRAC) [Ref. 10: p. 8.].
The following year, during its twentieth year of existence, the IRAC finally ap-
proved a set of bylaws that would govern its activities and procedures [Ref.
8: p. 18].
E. V/ORLD WAR II
The Second World War place unprecedented demands on the communi-
cations capabilities of the country, and even more acutely on the FCC and the
IRAC. In 1942, President Roosevelt created the Board of War Communications
so that a body existed at the Executive Branch level that could be used to
conduct assessments of the nation's communication systems. The members
of the Board included
• FCC Chairman, as chair
• Chief Signal Officer of the Army
• Director of Naval Communications
• Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Division of International
Communication
• Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of the Coast Guard
The IRAC was assigned as an advisory committee to the Board [Ref. 8: p. 18].
As early as 1943. the IRAC began to deny requests for frequency assign-
ments. The principle concern was that the usable portion of the spectrum had
been exhausted. This caused a division between the IRAC, who represented
the government's needs, and the FCC. who was obliged to defend commercial
interests. The disputes were sufficient to result in a Congressional investi-
gation and with calls for greater clarification of roles and resposiblities in the
Executive Branch regarding the management of the radio frequency spectrum
[Ref. 8: p. 19].
F. POST WORLD WAR II
The rapid advances in technology during World War II combined with the
natural breakdown in international cooperation caused by the war had created
disorder in the recording of frequency assignments and a pressing need to
address the new portions of the spectrum that were being exploited. An
International Radio Conference was convened in 1947 (Atlantic City) to deal
with these problems. Many of the member countries of the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU) underwent significant changes in their communi-
cations capabilities in the nine years that had passed since the previous
conference. The three major actions of the Convention that affected frequency
allocation were
• The division of the world into three regions, as a part of the Radio Regu-
lations, for the purpose of frequency allocation.
• The Frequency Allocation Board was created.
• The International Frequency Registration Board was created. [Ref. 11: pp.
237-241]
Domestically, the United States was grappling with the need to develop
joint policy direction for radio, telephone and telegraph services. In 1945. the
Telecommunications Coordinating Committee was established within the De-
partment of State as an advisory board to the President on telecommunication
matters. The TCC proved ineffectual, however, due to its inability to exercise
any control over the FCC or the IRAC [Ret. 8: p. 19].
The inability of the TCC to function effectively combined with a failure of
the ITU's Provisional Frequency Board to resolve frequency registration prob-
lems caused significant pressure to be put on President Truman to create an
Executive level agency with the authority to draft telecommunications policy
for the government. In 1950, Executive Order 10110 established the President's
Communications Policy Board (PCPB). This board was charged with providing
the President with a report that evaluated and recommended
• Policies for the most effective use of radio frequencies by governmental
and non-governmental agencies and alternative administrative arrange-
ments for the sound effectuation of such policies.
• Policies with respect to international radio and wire communications.
• Guidelines to govern the relationship between government communi-
cations and non-government communications.
• Any other such policies that the Board determined to be relevant to their
area of study. [Ref. 12: pp. 2-3]
The Board's final report was submitted in 1951. and the first of four general
problem areas they identified was
How shall the United States formulate policies and plans for guidance in recon-
ciling the conflicting interests and needs of Government and private users of
spectrum space? [Ref. 12: p. 8]
The PCPB had identified specific problems that fundamentally precluded
the effective management of the radio frequency spectrum. The first of these
was that both the FCC and the IRAC were Inextricably tied to separate, com-
peting user groups. No national policy existed to clarify the dual control that
existed over this single resource and to assist in apportioning the spectrum
between government and non-government users [Ref. 12: p. 187]. No criteria
existed on which to evaluate the conflicting needs that had and would continue
to arise. In addition, the TCC was incapable of playing any major role in the
formulation of policy. TCC procedures were based on unanimity, therefore any
dissent effectively doomed proposals being considered. The report recom-
mended a reorganization and strengthening of the TCC.
The primary recommendation in the report was for the creation of a three
man Telecommunications Advisory Board within the Executive Office of the
President. This board would execute the President's responsibilities under the
Communications Act of 1934, and would "stimulate and coordinate the formu-
lation and publication of plans and policies..." [Ref. 12: p. 209] One of the first
tasks of this new body would be to evaluate the Federal Government's use of
frequencies to determine if they supported a demonstrated need. Based upon
the recommendations of the report, in October 1951. President Truman estab-
lished the Office of Telecommunications Advisor and assigned to it those re-
sponsibilities recommended by the PCPB.
The next year was marked by the release of a major report entitled Radio
Spectrum Conservation [Ref. 13], which contained the results of work by the
Joint Technical Advisory Committee of the Radio-Television Manufacturer's
Association and the Institute of Radio Engineers. While this document dealt
primarily with technical concerns about the spectrum, it did contain a proposal
for a new way of allocating spectrum aptly entitled Dynamic Conservation.
Stated simply, allocations would no longer be considered permanent in nature.
The allocation scheme would be designed to "accomodate new services as
their value is established and close out or restrict older services as their value
wanes" [Ref. 13: p. 177]. As changes in technology allowed spectrum to be
used more efficiently, there would be incentives, primarily economic, that
would encourage the utilization of newer equipment and procedures. The re-
port did fail to address how the emphasis on a more competitive approach to
spectrum allocation and regulation would overcome the political and bureau-
cratic hurdles necessry to overhaul the existing system.
Less than two years after it was created, the Office of Telecommunications
Advisor was abolished when President Eisenhower revoked the original Exec-
utive Order. Under a new Order, the responsibilities for telecommunication
plans and policies were assigned to the Director for Defense Mobilization. The
Office of Assistant Director for Telecommunications was established within the
Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) to formulate national policy on telecom-
munication issues [Ref. 8: pp. 32-34]. One of the results of this new structure
was that the IRAQ now reported directly to the Assistant Secretary in the ODM.
This arrangement, combined with the communication demands of supporting
troops during the Korean Conflict, created, in the words of Herbert Schiller, a
"military takeover" of IRAC [Ref. 14 p. 36]. Increasingly the Department of
Defense began to provide greater administrative and financial support to
IRAC. In October 1953, FCC membership in the IRAC was ended, and re-
placed by a new liaison relationship. This further weakened the voice of the
private sector in the apportionment of spectrum for government use [Ref. 14
p. 37].
G. THE1960'S
The increasing influence of the military in the process and execution of
spectrum management became even more pronounced during the early
1960's. An appraisal conducted in 1961 concluded that only 30 percent of the
spectrum was available to non-goverment users with
the remaining 70 percent being Government agency controlled, with about 40
percent exclusively Government and totally withdrawn from citizen use. [Ref. 15:
p. 168]
While technical and security concerns prevented any precise determination,
one estimate by the Government stated that the Armed Forces accounted for
about three-fifths of the Government's portion of the radio spectrum [Ref. 16:
p. 24].
In February 1962, President Kennedy created the Office of Telecommuni-
cation Management within the Office of Emergency Planning (the second gen-
eration successor to the ODM). The IRAC was to act in an advisory capacity
to the new office. The intent of this change was to centralize control over
Government communications. Eighteen months later, the National Communi-
cations System (NCS) was established, marking the 'formal assumption of
control of all government communication (at least those of a long line nature)
by the Department of Defense" [Ref. 14: p. 43]. Facilitating the further
militarization of governmental communications was the resignation of the first
Director of Telecommunications Management, Irwin Stewart, in 1963. Later
that year, concerned by the growing military control over the spectrum.
Stewart wrote, "should the military assessment of its communications needs
and the best way of meeting them be accepted without question?" [Ref. 17: p.
163] These concerns were not assuaged when President Johnson's nominee
to fill the post vacated by Stewart was Lt. General James D. O'Connell. U. S.
Army (Retired), a former Chief Signal Officer of the Army [Ref. 14: p. 45].
As the decade passed, there was an increasing interest to reevaluate the
current structure and process. On August 14. 1967. President Johnson sent a
lengthy message to Congress that covered an array of communications issues,
and also advised them that a Task force on Communications Policy was being
appointed. One of the major questions they were to study was. "Are we mak-
ing the best use of the electromagnetic spectrum?" [Ref. 18: p. 8] When the
report (known as the Rostow Report) was filed, several problems were identi-
fied.
• The block allocation scheme had created systemic sub-optimal allocation
and inefficiency.
• The division of government and non-government spectrum resources and
management procedures had created inefficiency.
• Spectrum waste was a significant problem.
• Criteria for apportioning spectrum among competing users was unsatis-
factory.
• The staff and funding for spectrum management was inadequate. [Ref. 9:
pp. 8-19-8-27]
Their general recommendations were
• A greater consideration of economic factors was needed which would re-
sult in high-value spectrum uses being substituted for low-value uses.
• More emphasis was needed on spectrum engineering and technical con-
siderations.
• Greater management capabilities and a restructuring of responsibility and
authority are required. [Ref. 9: pp. 8-63-8-66]
One specific recommendation made was that a single agency be created within
the Executive Branch with overall responsibility for efficient use of the spec-
trum by all users. It is noteworthy that General O'Connell filed a lengthy dis-
sent to the report, but he did not take exception to any of the recommendations
made regarding spectrum management [Ref. 19: p. 10]. Having been pre-
sented to President Johnson shortly after a Republican victory in the Presi-
dential elections, the report suffered from poor timing and was never officially
released.
H. THE NIXON YEARS
Shortly after taking office, President Nixon appointed Peter M. Flanigan
and Maurice A. Stans (his Secretary of Commerce) to be his key men regard-
ing telecommunications management. Stans clearly wanted to exercise con-
trol over allocation and apportionment. He argued that the Rostow Report
supported his position as did an additional study by the Bureau of the Budget
[Ref. 8: pp. 103-107]. The strongest point that Stans had in his favor was that
every major study since the PCPB Report in 1951 had recommended that a
single agency be responsible for spectrum management. This "power play"
by Stans was effectively countered by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who
argued that the FCC, having been created by Congress as an independent
regulatory agency, could not become a part of the Executive Branch without
violating the Communications Act of 1934. The Stans proposal represents the
last attempt to consolidate all spectrum management within one agency.
In July 1969, the Government Accounting Office released a report that
amounted to a report card for the NCS. It recommended a strengthening of the
Office of Telecommunications Management: first by moving it directly into the
Executive Office of the President, and secondly by establishing it as the Exec-
utive Agent for the NCS [Ref. 20]. By September of that year, the Director of
Telecommunications Management had written to the President requesting an
end to all the studies which were creating confusion and delaying important
decisions. General OConnell recommended a continuation of the status quo
[Ret. 21]. He was mandatorily retired due to age within a month of writing his
letter, and the internal machinations at the White House continued [Ref. 8: p.
117].
Finally in April of 1970, the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) was
created within the Executive Branch. The responsibilities of the OTP included
• To act as the President s primary advisor on telecommunications policy,
helping in the formulation of domestic and international policy.
• To formulate policies and to coordinate the Federal Government's com-
munications systems.
• To act as a clear voice from the Executive Branch in dealing with the
Congress and the FCC on areas of mutual interest or concern. [Ref. 22:
p. 20]
For the first time, the individual responsible for the formulation of spectrum
management policy would report directly to the President. The hope was that
through a centralized agency, the government would be able to develop more
effective policy and to simplify the regulatory process. Whether this would
have happened is a question that need not be answered, for within the decade
OTP would be abolished.
I. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION
Shortly after taking office. President Carter introduced Reorganization Plan
No. 1. which was approved by Congress, authorizing the establishment of the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information. This
was followed by the creation of the National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration (NTIA) within the Department of Commerce. This new
agency would combine the OTP and the Department of Commerce's Office of
Telecommunications, and would report to the Secretary of Commerce [Ref.
23: p. 1]. The IRAC would now report to the NTIA, and in fact the IRAC chair
would be filled by a representative from NTIA. Critics charged that this new
administration was relegating spectrum management to a less important role,
and that this v\/ould most likely lead to failure.
The NTIA is still in existence today, and is charged with the management
of the radio frequency spectrum for the Federal Government. The agency's
organization and the current administrative structure will be discussed in the
next chapter.
J. SUMMARY
In spite of numerous studies that have produced hundreds of recommen-
dations, the Federal Government has been unable, and in many cases unwill-
ing, to make any changes to the dual system where the FCC manages private
use while the NTIA manages government use of spectrum resources. Even
though the necessary coordination between the FCC and the NTIA/IRAC oc-
curs in most cases, the potential for conflict still exists, and many of the long
standing problems with spectrum management and utilization remain unre-
solved. What emerges from this look at the past is that the current system has
performed well enough to keep the Government from being forced to make any
substantive changes.
III. CURRENT U. S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
While both the private sector and the Federal Government utilize the radio
frequency spectrum, the processes that they use and the agencies they work
with to obtain an assignment are different. This chapter will deal primarily with
the spectrum management structure and processes that apply to a Federal
Government agency request for spectrum, although the liaison and cooper-
ative role that is played by the FCC will be discussed. Initially the discussion
will address the highest level of national spectrum management and will work
down to the level above the individual service components and unified com-
mands.
A. FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
1. The NTIA
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the NTIA was created in
1978 within the Department of Commerce as the Executive branch agency
principally responsible for the development and presentation of domestic and
international telecommunications policy. The agency states its primary re-
sponsibilities and functions as:
• serving as the principal Executive branch adviser to the President on
matters concerning telecommunications and information policy
• developing and presenting U.S. domestic and international telecommuni-
cations and information plans and policies, and coordinating U.S. Gov-
ernment positions with respect to international conferences and meetings,
in consultation with the FCC and the Department of State
• prescribing policies for and managing Federal use of the radio frequency
spectrum
• serving as the principal Federal telecommunications research and study
center
• administering the Public Telecommunications Facility Program (PTFP).
[Ref. 23: pp. 1-2]
During 1988. NTIA had approximately 300 employees, the majority of whom
were primarily assigned to frequency management or to PTFP duties. In
January 1989. the agency was placed within the Department of Commerce
Technology Administration, and the Assistant Secretary for Communications
and Information now reports to the Under Secretary for Technology. The
general organization for the NTIA is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. NTIA Organization
The principle staff element responsible for spectrum matters is the Of-
fice of Spectrum fvlanagement. Figure 2 depicts the organization of this office.
Within this office there are four organizational elements involved with the
spectrum. The Director of Spectrum Plans and Policies is concerned with both
international and national spectrum policies. This office is the focus for all
Government preparations for ITU Conferences. The Director acts as the IRAC
chair, and the IRAC is responsible for providing support to this office. The
Frequency Assignment and IRAC Administrative Support Division is con-
cerned with the daily processing of frequency assignment requests and with
the management of these assignments. The Spectrum Engineering and Anal-
ysis Division provides support to the Director in resolving electromagnetic
compatibility problems and in the preparation of technical studies necessary
for national and international spectrum management. The Computer Services
Division is essentially a support element that provides computer operations
and software support needed by the other divisions [Ref. 24: p. 124],
The Office of Spectrum Management was organized in this fashion to
be well aligned with the four management program areas it has defined.
These are: the Spectrum Plans and Policies Program, the Spectrum Manage-
ment Program, the Spectrum Analysis Program, and the Frequency Assign-
ment and Utilization Program.
The Spectrum Plans and Policies Program is concerned with the long-
range plans for national use of the spectrum and is responsible for the devel-
opment and maintenance of the National Table of Frequency Allocations. In
addition, this program coordinates input and prepares U.S. positions and pro-
posals for international conferences. Plans and policies that govern the use
of the spectrum by the Federal Government are also developed by this pro-
gram. They provide direction and guidance to the IRAC in its deliberations,
and finally they are responsible for attempting to resolve conflicting require-





























Figure 2. Office of Spectrum f\/'ianagement
The Spectrum Management Program is charged with providing techni-
cal and administrative support to the IRAC and with training for spectrum
management personnel. The Spectrum Analysis Program conducts constant
assessments of the frequency bands to determine if electromagnetic compat-
ibility exists among current and proposed uses. In addition, they must review
new system developments to decide how new communications equipment can
be accomodated in the spectrum. They are the office responsible for providing
input on management problems related to technical issues, and they develop
new analysis techniques in an effort to resolve efficiency problems.
The Frequency Assignment and Utilization Program processes re-
quests for and authorizes frequency assignments. It also maintains the data-
bases concerning the use and management of the spectrum. Lastly, it is
responsible for the monitoring of Federal Government spectrum use [Ref. 24:
p. 125].
In addition to these components, the Office of Spectrum Management
is assisted in the execution of its duties by two advisory bodies. The first of
these is the Frequency Management Advisory Council. Originally established
in 1965. the Council is to advise the Secretary of Commerce on matters con-
cerning spectrum allocation and assignment that can improve the Federal
Governments frequency management. Specifically, they review recommen-
dations of the IRAC. review current electromagnetic compatibility problems,
and provide input for U.S. positions and proposals at international conferences
[Ref. 2: p. 1-12]. The second advisory body, and by far the more important, is
the IRAC.
2. The IRAC
Having been originally established in 1922, the IRAC is the nation's longest
standing body concerned with the Federal Government's use and manage-
ment of the radio frequency spectrum and the principal advisory board to the
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in addition, the FCC appoints a representative to serve as a liaison to the
Committee. [Ref. 2: p. 1-6]
The IRAC has developed a permanent substructure, as shown in Figure
3, to assist in the execution of its duties. The Frequency Assignment Sub-
committee is responsible for recommending assignment of frequencies for
Government radio stations and for coordinating with the FCC on shared spec-
trum. The Spectrum Planning Subcommittee plans apportionment of the
spectrum based on established and anticipated requirements. The Technical
Subcommittee recommends standards for the improvement of spectrum utili-
zation, and evaluates the potential of new spectrum optimization techniques.
The International Notification Group notifies the ITU of U.S. frequency assign-
ments, and the Secretariat performs the administrative functions of the IRAC
[Ref. 25; p. 2]. The FCC maintains a direct liaison role with all of the subcom-
mittees, and its participation is the primary means of coordinating between





















Figure 3. IRAC Structure
3. The Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB)
The lowest level structurally that will be addressed is the MCEB. This board
is responsible for providing the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with support in the coordination of communications and
electronics activities among the Armed Forces. The Frequency Panel (FP) of
the MCEB is the principal entity within the DOD concerned with spectrum
management. It is responsible for:
• developing policies and procedures for DOD frequency management
• providing joint and interservice military frequency engineering and man-
agement
• providing frequency engineering and management assistance to other
DOD components upon request
• maintaining the Frequency Resource Record System. [Ref. 25: pp. 2-3]
B. SPECTRUIVl MANAGEIVIENT PROCESSES
Having been presented with an overview of the primary agencies and
bodies related to spectrum management for the Federal Government, now the
specific processes that are used to make the system function must be re-
viewed. The NTIA has specified five separate functions that make up spectrum
management decision processes. These are
• determining that spectrum is available before the Federal Government is
authorized to purchase a new system
• engineering frequency assignments to ensure that systems will be com-
patible with existing and planned systems
• monitoring the use of the spectrum to guarantee that assignments are
being used as authorized
• continually reassessing the actual, planned, and potential uses of the
spectrum to determine probable areas of incompatibility, to determine the
potential for intra- and inter-service sharing, and to determine possible
expanded uses of the spectrum
• maintaining a timely and accurate record of all uses of the spectrum.
[Ref. 24: pp. 127-128]
Implementation of the first function has been accomplished at all levels
within the spectrum management structure. All equipment under consider-
ation for development, purchase or lease by the military that will require the
allocation of spectrum resources must gain initial approval from the Frequency
Panel of the MCEB [Ref. 25: p. 2]. While the MCEB is not directly represented
on the IRAC. the FP does supply the committee with information concerning
DOD allocation requirements. Figure 4 shows the relationship of the MCEB
and its FP to the other departments, agencies and committees involved. At the
IRAC level, the proposal is reviewed again by the Spectrum Planning Sub-
committee (SPS) for conformance with existing regulation and compatibility
with other systems in the proposed band. Following a favorable review by the
SPS. the NTIA will notify the requesting agency that spectrum space is
available.
A multi-level review occurs in the MCEB and the IRAC to engineer fre-
quency assignments so that interference does not occur. After a successful
review by the MCEB the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee of the IRAC
provides a secondary review to determine conformity with regulations and
system compatibility. Only then will the NTIA authorize an assignment.
Monitoring the use of the spectrum is the responsibility of every authorized
user. The NTIA performs this function through the use of a mobile van. The
van monitors radio transmissions and determines channel usage. In addition,
the NTIA does perform a limited number of inspections. Finally, the FAS must
review all frequency assignments every five years to determine that the need
still exists.
The fourth function combines technical, administrative and operational
analysis to determine possible problem areas, and to develop the necessary
means to correct them. A secondary goal is to establish policies and proce-
dures that will allow for more intensive use of the available spectrum.
The fifth and final function Is to maintain the data necessary to support the
spectrum management processes. The NTIA and the MCEB both maintain
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Figure 4. Frequency Management Channels
include more information about systems, and are updated to reflect current
assignments.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter was intended to show both the structure that exists to manage
the Federal Governments use of the spectrum and the functions that the re-
spective agencies and boards perform. Combining this with an understanding
of the national goals and objectives from Chapter One provides a fairly sound
basis on which to evaluate the potential of different regulatory schemes to im-
prove spectrum utilization.
IV. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES
The earlier portion of this thesis has concentrated on a more descriptive
approach to spectrum management as it is executed in the United States. The
issues to be discussed now must be addressed in a more analytical fashion,
as they deal with the primary areas of concern and provide alternative means
of carrying out spectrum management. The majority of this discussion will
again deal with national spectrum management; however, the increasing
complexity of international spectrum matters will impact U.S. practices, so
some discussion of international activity is necessary.
Interference is the root problem of all spectrum management issues. It may
also be known as overcrowding or congestion, terms that imply an increasing
possibility of interference: but by whatever name, it means that radio commu-
nications are obstructed, seriously degraded, or repeatedly interrupted by
other signals possessing similar characteristics [Ref. 2 : p. 6-5]. It is important
to note that current regulatory schemes are intended to be preventive, not
corrective. For spectrum management to follow this guideline, it must address
two general issues:
• What are the optimal allocation and assignment schemes? In other
words, how does the regulatory body decide who gets spectrum and how
much will they get?
• Secondly, once someone has been authorized to use a portion of the
spectrum, what ownership rights does that person have over that band?
Included in this is the level of protection offered by the regulating body
of these rights.
The remainder of this chapter will look at the current methods of allocation
used by United States, and the implicit and explicit ownership rights conferred
upon the user. This will be followed by a discussion of alternative methods
of allocating the spectrum and an assessment of their potential.
A. CURRENT U.S. SCHEMES
1. Allocation
The current allocation scheme in the U.S. is consistent with that of the
ITU and is known by the term block allocation. This means that the spectrum
is divided into blocks, and specific services are assigned to each block. The
following example will serve to explain the principle. The UHF band (300-3000
MHz) has been one region of the spectrum where the congestion problem has
been especially acute. Within the band is the block of frequencies from
512-608 MHz. This portion of the spectrum is reserved exclusively for the
broadcast of UHF television signals [Ref. 2: p. 4-53]. In many parts of the
country, much of this block of spectrum will be unused for the allocated ser-
vice, but because of the block allocation technique, it is effectively removed
from use by other services. This has resulted in significant portions of the
usable spectrum being wasted.
Given that block allocation is not an efficient means of allocating the
spectrum, the question arises as to why it was ever chosen, and why it is still
the dominant method both internationally and domestically. In the words of
one author.
The existing allocation process can be considered as a form of a priori planning
where a predetermined amount of resource is dedicated to a specific purpose.
Like other a priori plans, it introduces rigidity while freeing administrations from
the responsibility of providing dynamic management of the resource. [Ref. 26:
p. 693]
In an earlier age. when usable spectrum was abundant and technical advances
continued to "stretch" the spectrum, block allocation was adequate to meet the
needs of the users. The principal advantages were the simplicity in managing
the system and the equipment standardization that occured. In a period of
signifcant congestion, block allocation does not have the flexibility of adapting
to meet the current requirements. Twenty-one years ago, the Rostow Report
critized the inflexibility of the system. Occasionly the spectrum management
structure was able to respond to congestion problems, but only after lengthy
negotiation and coordination [Ref. 9: p. 8-21].
It is puzzling that, given the inflexibility of this allocation scheme, it will
be used for the forseeable future. NTIA released NTIA Telecom 2000 in Octo-
ber 1988, outlining projected changes in telecommunications up to the year
2000 and Government initiatives to stay current and manage these changes.
In that report they imply that the block allocation technique will continue to be
used [Ref. 27: pp. 655-662] .
2. Assignment
The determination of frequency assignments must be based on some
system that can determine relative value of services based on a set of stand-
ards considered valid by competing interests. It is also in the interest of the
government that the standards be easy to measure and difficult to exaggerate.
Current NTIA policy states that radio frequency assignments will generally
occur in the following order:
• Frequencies used primarily, predominantly, and directly for national se-
curity and defense, for purposes which are vital to the safety of the Nation.
• Frequencies used primarily, predominantly,and directly to safeguard life
and property in conditions of distress.
• Frequencies used primarily, predominantly, and directly to safeguard life
and property in other than conditions of distress where other means of
communication are not available.
• Frequencies used in scientific research and those used in services that
have no adequate means of rapid communication, when such use is con-
sidered to be necessary or desirable in the national interest.
• Frequencies for all other purposes, the assignment of which must be
judged upon the merits of the intended use. [Ref. 2: p. 2-4]
What emerges from these guidelines is that they lack clarity, are subject to
substantial subjectivity in interpretation, and do not allow for objective com-
parisons of competing interests. In many respects it is a tribute to the people
who are actively engaged in spectrum management for the Federal Govern-
ment that, using these standards, they are able to routinely assign frequencies
without causing significant bureaucratic infighting. On the other hand, it cannot
be suprising that there have been numerous complaints over the Govern-
ment's inability to provide justification for much of the spectrum it uses.
When assignments are made, the user generally assumes some own-
ership rights. The services are described in descending priority as primary,
permitted, and secondary. When interference occurs, disputes tend to be re-
solved first by priority of service, and within a given priority level, by seniority
regarding the date of frequency assignment. This method has developed over
time and is used both internationally and nationally [Ref. 5: p. 48]. This prac-
tice of providing greater protection to the first user to receive assignments
within a band has been an incentive for users to overstate their needs and to
subsequently "bank" excess spectrum for the future [Ref. 9: p. 8-29],
B. ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES
Clearly the current management schemes have significant drawbacks that will
become more acute as demand for the spectrum increases. Different methods
of accomplishing the same objectives must be evaluated to see if they can
provide both a more efficient distribution of spectrum resources and the in-
centives necessary so that users will compete for only that portion of the
spectrum that they truly need. Many different schemes have been proposed,
but there is one common thread among them: a greater reliance economic
incentives to achieve optimal spectrum utilization.
1. Free Market Approach
This constitutes the most radical departure from the existing regulatory
schemes. Under this scheme spectrum would be bought and sold, with the
owner having the rights of emission, admission, use, and transferability.
Emission rights constitute the owner's right to radiate within the frequency
band that is owned. This would necessitate a three dimensional definition of
the spectrum that includes frequency band size, time, and power. Admission
rights concern the user's ability to refuse access to another user. Use rights
means that the owner must be allowed to do anything legally permissable with
that portion of the spectrum that is owned. Lastly, transferability rights include
the owner's right to transfer emission and admission rights to others [Ref. 28:
p. 5].
Conceptually, this scheme would result in an economically efficient
distribution of the spectrum. There are practical factors that effectively rule
out this alternative as an option. Since the spectrum fails to recognize national
boundaries, it will be impossible for one nation to guarantee the ownership
rights to a buyer. The nature of the spectrum is that while it may be used, it
cannot be controlled. Secondly, if a free market approach is adopted, how
would the government obtain spectrum resources? Should all spectrum be
sold in a competitive market environment, or would spectrum be reserved,
free of charge for use by the government? If all available spectrum space was
to be sold, the government would not be able to guarantee that it could obtain
the amount necessary to meet the public need. If spectrum was reserved for
government use, there is no incentive for the government to be efficient in its
use.
It is generally agreed that a free market scenario is unworkable, both
practically and politically, but it does offer a new perspective from which to
view the entire issue. This approach forces users to assign a monetary value
to the spectrum they have or need, and provides them with economic incen-
tives to be more efficient in their use of spectrum resources. It is interesting
to consider, because the free market approach substantially reduces the gov-
ernment need to regulate spectrum use. There have been experiments pro-
posed in the VHF and UHF television bands to evaluate how market forces
would impact on the use of the spectrum [Ref. 28: p. 8].
2. Auctioning Rights
While similar to the free market in certain respects, auctioning would
entail individuals bidding in interband and intraband contests for spectrum
space. There are two possible approaches for such auctions with users re-
ceiving bandwidth or with users bidding on services (e.g., auctions of com-
mercial FM services). Again, as in the free market approach. The owners
would have significant rights over the spectrum or service that they had pur-
chased. If spectrum were auctioned outright, the owners would have the abil-
ity to sublet or rent their space to other users. This system again uses
economic incentives to force users to place dollar values on the spectrum that
they need. A variation on this would be to hold lotteries, where there is an
established price and anyone willing to pay can enter the process.
The problems for the Federal Government's use of spectrum space are
very much the same as under the previous alternative. Agencies will be un-
willing to pay for a resource that has been free of cost. Additionally, there is
no incentive to be efficient if the Government reserves portions of the spec-
trum for its exclusive use [Ref. 3: pp. 142-143].
3. User Fees
Using this scheme, charges would be applied to the users based on how much
spectrum space they use. Spectrum use would be defined by time, geographic
area, and bandwidth. A hybrid approach to these would be to assign user fees
to services. Prices could be determined by any of the following methods:
• Established through interband auctions
• Estimated on what users are willing to pay rather than do without a unit
of the resource
• Established at some flat rate. [Ref. 3: p. 85]
One of the attractive advantages of this approach is that the Federal Govern-
ment could derive revenue from the user fees to pay for spectrum manage-
ment. A variation of this basic concept is that only commmercial users would
have to pay and the government would again be exempted. This eliminates
the incentive by government users to declare their actual needs and to be ef-
ficient with spectrum space.
4. Shadow pricing
This alternative is dependent on being able to determine what users are will-
ing to pay for an additional piece of spectrum space. If demand for the spec-
trum is high, the price for another unit would be high to drive demand down,
and the converse would be true when demand is low. After some period of
time, an equilbrium price would be established [Ref. 3: p. 86].
There are a number of hybrid approaches that amount to combinations
of certain aspects of those already discussed. One final alternative is to try to
create administrative regulations used in spectrum management that attempt
to simulate market forces, thereby providing incentives to users to again place
some physical value on spectrum space.
C. ANALYSIS
Each of these alternatives has aspects that make them desirable to some
segment of users. From a national viewpoint, the objective has been estab-
lished that the intention of spectrum management is to make optimum use of
the spectrum. This scheme should result in high-value applications receiving
the needed space with low value users moving to other methods of trans-
mission. One of the principal criticisms of the government's current frequency
allocation is that there has been little documentation to validate the need or to
evaluate whether only high value appplications are competing for space.
All of these proposals, with the exception of the proposal on new adminis-
trative methods, would involve removing the degree of control that the gov-
ernment has over the supply of spectrum. This means that for equilibrium to
be established, the scheme must allow market forces the flexibility to react to
changes. This is most clear in the free market approach, where the govern-
ment is effectively on the sidelines. In the other approaches, some means
other than pure market pressure is used to set the initial price for spectrum
space. This could induce an unexpected demand initially, but over time if al-
lowed to act as a market good, equilibrium again should be reached. Any one
of these proposals, if properly implemented, should serve as an incentive to
evaluate the level of spectrum used, while looking at alternative methods or
new technology to be more efficient.
The central question is whether one of these methods could successfully
be implemented by the Federal Government to manage the demand for its
spectrum space. There are significant concerns that have little to do with
spectrum space that affect this issue. No agency, be it government or private,
wants to suddenly incur costs for the use of a resource that it has enjoyed
previously free of charge. This would mean that any scheme where users
would have to literally buy space or time would meet with considerable
opposition. A second issue is that, within the government, there is no
guarantee that the agency with the greatest need for spectrum will have the
means to pay for it. The Federal Government's decision criteria on how
spectrum should be assigned do not include any way of quantifying how im-
portant the environment is when compared to national defense.
A second source of potential conflict is how spectrum would be redistrib-
uted under the plan. This means that any scheme resulting in an initial redis-
tribution of spectrum space from the current distribution will be subject to
substantial opposition. Realistically, the Government must recognize the level
of capital investment that it has made in communications equipment which
could be rendered useless by such a change. More practically, any change
would virtually have to cede ownership to the current user. This eliminates the
possibility of holding auctions for large blocks of spectrum. But, once owner-
ship has been ceded to the current owner, there is little incentive for that
owner to release it. unless there are incentives for such a move. This would
mean that agencies that have portions of the spectrum with relatively low
utilization rates should be penalized for low use. The primary problem with
this approach is that the Federal Government uses a great deal of spectrum
where dedicated channels exist for emergency purposes. Thus low utilization
alone may not be sufficient to warrant penalties.
The bottom line is that while many of these alternatives provide interesting
possibilities, there is little hope of seeing any widespread change in the cur-
rent method of allocation. While both reports by the FCC and work by others
indicate that there could be a substantial reduction in regulatory action by the
Government if alternative management techniques were used in the private
sector [Refs. 28. 3], there seems to be little movement towards a more market
oriented approach in the private sector, and no indication that a new approach
should be taken in the Government's own use of the spectrum.
This apparent lack of interest in the Federal Government changing its al-
location scheme does not mean that it could not be improved. It is in this area
that the concept of new administrative techniques is most promising. Current
procedures require that the NTIA make a finding that spectrum space is avail-
able prior to any work on a new system. This concept of frequency clearance
should help to make better decisions [Ref. 3: p. 170]. There is a secondary
problem of stockpiling that still exists. This can basically be defined as the
setting aside of frequencies to prepare for growth and future uses. A second-
ary problem that has caused problems in the international arena is the stock-
piling of frequencies that were once heavily used but now have only limited
utilization [Ref. 29: p. 192]. The military has historically depended on public
trust of its own evaluation of the need for space as sufficient. In a period of
increasing demand for spectrum space, the military can expect a more difficult
time obtaining resources if the requirements for such space are not well es-
tablished.
D. SUMMARY
There is not sufficient domestic pressure on the current spectrum man-
agement processes to bring about any broad changes by either the NTIA or
the FCC. There is enough spectrum available to meet the immediate and
projected needs. The greatest potential threat comes from international forces
that desire more spectrum space. Their concerns at the 1979 World Adminis-
trative Radio Conference resulted in the United Spates losing some of its
stockpiled HF frequency space [Ref. 29]. This international emphasis makes
it necessary for the United States to better document the stockpiling of fre-
quencies and to work towards higher utilization rates on assigned frequencies
that are only used sparingly. Only by increasing utilization can the Govern-
ment demonstrate that the current frequencies assigned are needed. This
means that current spectrum management procedures may have to be
changed to encourage greater use of the spectrum, specifically in bands that
have fallen into disuse. This may be the only way to guarantee the continued
availability of those frequencies.
V. TECHNOLOGY AND THE RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
The developed countries have traditionally used technology as an ally in
attennpting to increase the size and capabilities of the usable spectrum. In the
early part of this century, this meant that only a handful of nations were com-
peting for that space. Generally, by the time crowding was a significant prob-
lem, technology had increased the size of the spectrum so that new
frequencies could be exploited and the congestion tended to resolve itself.
As time as passed, the situation has changed dramatically. That small group
of nations, each wanting a part of the spectrum, now numbers over 160 [Ref.
27: p. 556]. A second problem is that the laws of physics apply to
electromagnetic waves, and this creates physical limits on what can be ex-
pected of the usable spectrum. Below 10 KHz. antenna efficiency is so low that
it makes this portion of the spectrum unusable for all but an extremely limited
number of applications. Above 20 GHz. atmospheric attenuation is the limiting
factor in an electron-based communications system. This means that for the
overwhelming majority of electronic systems the effective operative spectrum
is between 10 KHz - 20 GHz. The challenge becomes one of increasing the size
of the usable spectrum within those bounds [Ref. 30: p. 12].
The existence of these physical limits does not alter the fact that the uses
of the spectrum have changed significantly since the first wireless trans-
missions. The amount of equipment needed by today's military commander
has grown and continues to grow. One estimate done by the British Army
showed that the number of radios averaged one per hundred soldiers in World
War I. but now averages one per soldier. Added to this are the concerns over
modern elctronic warfare. The modern commander must be concerned with
the jamming and intercept of friendly transmissions, while attempting to do the
same to those of the opponent [Ref. 30: p. 13].
The questions that need to be answered are:
• What new tools have been created by technology to attack these prob-
lems?
• What is the impact of technologies' answers on spectrum utilization?
The traditional means used to improve utilization have been the exploitation
of higher frequency bands, the employment of advanced modulation tech-
niques, and the use of different polarization schemes. As was already dis-
cussed, new applications are being created faster than technology can
respond to increase the size of the usable spectrum; therefore, frequency re-
use techniques must rely heavily on the last two alternatives. This chapter will
look at how the requirements for communications links in today's military en-
vironment is being met by technology, and how technology is helping.
A. ADVANCED MODULATION TECHNIQUES
The modern communications environment for the military commander de-
mands that more links be established than ever before. This means that ad-
vanced modulation techniques must be used in conjunction with greater
flexibility in providing multiple access in order to meet the demand. The main
modulation schemes that are employed to allow for spectrum reuse are :




• Hybrid spread spectrum forms
Many of these forms are used with one of the following multiple access
schemes:
• Frequency Division Multiple Access
• Time Division Multiple Access
• Spread Spectrum Multiple Access
Each modulation and access technique will be briefly outlined to establish the
nature and advantages of a given scheme.
1. Single Side Band (SSB)
This is not a new concept, since SSB is used extensively in the HF band. What
has changed is that the technologies exist now to use SSB at frequencies up
to 1 GHz. From a spectrum standpoint, in the VHF band, a SSB signal can
operate in a bandwidth of 5 KHz as opposed to the traditional FM signal which
requires a bandwidth of 25 KHz. SSB requires about the same peak power as
an FM signal, but the average power radiated by the SSB transmitter is only
six percent of the power radiated by its FM counterpart [Ref. 30: p. 14]. This
makes interception and direction finding of the SSB signal much more difficult.
2. Frequency Hopping
Frequency hopping modulation systems utilize a large number of dis-
crete frequencies are used in the transmission of a signal. The frequencies
that are hopped to are spaced throughout the available band using a hopping
pattern that is known only to the desired receiver. The rate of hopping and the
hopping pattern can be changed to increase the difficulty in interception of the
signal. A second advantage is that since the transmitter and receiver must be
synchronized, the receiver will reject other signals that may be transmitted in
the same frequency band. It may seem that spread spectrum systems would
create more congestion since they require a greater bandwidth, but in actual
use, a frequency hopping modulation scheme can actually reduce the possi-
bility of harmful interference. [Refs. 31, 32]
3. Time Sequencing
Time sequencing or time hopping may be thought of as frequency
hopping in the time domain. Instead of varying the carrier frequency, the
transmitter varies the on and off keying times of the transmitter; thus, the sig-
nal appears to be random. This modulation scheme is used in conjunction
with time division systems to reduce interference. One of the primary limita-
tions of this scheme is that it is highly susceptible to jamming, since it operates
at a single carrier frequency. [Refs. 31, 32]
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4. Direct Sequencing
Direct sequence modulation uses a digital code sequence with a much
higher rate than the information signal bandwidth to modulate the carrier [Ref,
33]. Typically the information to be transmitted is digitized and added to the
spreading code which is then used to modulate the carrier. At the receiving
end, the signal must be multiplied by a reference with the same spreading
code for the information signal to be retrieved. Again by using the spreading
technique the power envelope is much broader and lower, thereby increasing
the difficulty in interception of the signal.
5. Hybrid techniques
Hybrid systems are especially prevalent in the military, and they are
made up of a combination of the previous techniques. The most common
combinations are:
• Simultaneous frequency hopping and direct sequence modulation
• Simultaneous time and frequency hopping
• Simultaneous time hopping and direct sequence modulation. [Ref. 31: p.
48]
These techniques have been used in an attempt to overcome some of the lim-
itations that the indiviual systems have and to improve performance in multi-
ple access environments.
6. Frequency Division IVlultiple Access (FDIVIA)
FDMA techniques involve the slicing of section of frequencies into a
number of smaller bands, and allowing multiple users to transmit within those
bands. Individual bandwidths would vary based on the information to be
transmitted over a channel. This helps to improve utilization within the band,
but in reality it is not much more than an extension of the current allocation
scheme. With a given level of technology and type of signal, there is a limit to
the number of times you can subdivide a frequency band.
7. Time Division IVlultiple Access (TDMA)
TDMA techniques allow the user to have access to the entire band-
width, but only during a specified time slot. Again, this provides greater
access in a multiple user environment, but at there is a lower limit on the size
of the time slice, below which the efficiency of the system is significantly
reduced. While bits travel at the same rate for the entire system, as the
number users Increases, the time slice decreases to a point where the infor-
mation rate of any individual receiver is significantly degraded. This limit is
a function of the technology in use, the data rates required for the signals, and
the characteristics of that region of the spectrum in which the system is de-
signed to operate.
8. Spread Spectrum Multiple Access (SSMA)
This technique is also referred to as Code Division Multiple Access.
Essentially, spread spectrum transmissions appear to be pseudorandom
signals that are transmitted over several frequencies and several time inter-
vals. Each user is assigned a unique code sequence, and all the signals share
a common bandwidth. The principle advantages of SSMA are:
• It does not need timing coordination.
• It has simultaneous random access.
• Bandwidth is utilized more efficiently and no guard bands are necessary.
[Ref. 34]
In all of these cases, by using a mutiple access scheme spectrum utilization is
increased.
B. POLARIZATION SCHEMES
One of the principal factors that can influence the bandwidth needed for a
given communications link is the characteristics of the antenna systems that
are used. Early antenna design tended to focus on omni-directional antennae,
which can be wasteful of spectrum. Newer designs have concentrated on
creating narrow beams to allow greater frequency reuse over geographic re-
gions. This has been especially successful in satellite communications. Ad-
ditionally, different polarization schemes have been used to increase the
possibilities for frequency reuse and for increasing flexibility in selecting
portions of the spectrum in which to operate. Opposite hand circular and
cross linear polarized antenna systems have the capacity to double the
available bandwidth under ideal conditions. The circularly polarized systems
operate most effectively in the lower end of the microwave region, while linear
polarization is better at the upper end. [Ref. 32: p. 22]
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT
The capabilities of spread spectrum systems have resulted in their extensive
use throughout all the services. The use of these systems has created a
number of problems with the existing spectrum management process. Ideally,
the services would like broad bands of spectrum available which they could
use for spread spectrum systems. Since spread spectrum systems are so
bandwidth intensive, it is only through the use of multiple access techniques
that these systems are feasible in the modern battlefield environment. Broad
bands of spectrum would allow for maximum flexibility in communications, and
would further enhance the low probability of interception and detection of
these systems. This idea of allocating large blocks of spectrum tends to run
counter to the typical block allocation scheme as it has been used in the past.
While a large band of spectrum may have been allocated for a specific service,
it was generally the minimum amount necessary to support the current de-
mand and projected growth for the service. The band was then subdivided
into channels, with this being the amount of bandwidth that would eventually
be assigned to a user. To guarantee that necessary flexibility is maintained,
spread spectrum systems desire just the opposite. The modern battle scenario
demands that there be an increased degree of flexibility.
D. ALTERNATIVES AND SUBSTITUTES
One of the traditional arguments for a more market-oriented spectrum
management process is that it forces people to make a determination that
signal transmission using the radio frequency spectrum is the most cost ef-
fective means available. Currently there are numerous substitutes for the
spectrum, but the unique requirements of the military often limit those that can
be considered. One promising area has been the growth in use of fiber optic
cable. A distinct advantage of using fiber is that it possesses very large
bandwiths, capable of extremely high rates of data transfer. The significant
limitation is that a physical link is required, thereby limiting the use of fiber to
permanent or semi-permanent locations.
A second alternative that the military service have been exploiting is more
of a procedural change than a technological one. There has been a significant
effort to move more communications links from voice to data. By moving from
voice to data, the information rate is reduced from 16 kilobits per second to
100 bits per second, generally. This reduced data rate allows for much more
rugged communications, without a need to increase the bandwidth. The prin-
cipal problem with this alternative is that users lose the immediacy and the
impact associated with voice, and as a result this method has not received
widespread attention outside military applications [Ref. 30: p. 14].
E. SUMMARY
In the past we have counted on technology to open up more of the spec-
trum for use. Now the operational requirements of the communications sys-
tems in use by the military demand that technology develop systems that use
large amounts of bandwidth. The electronic battlefield is one of the primary
reasons for multiple access, spread spectrum applications. Only through
greater flexibility in how spectrum is used can these systems be implemented
while maintaining compatibility. The use of low data rate systems provides
some promise for better spectrum utilization, but it does not seem likely that
users will ever eliminate the requirement for voice channels. The current
spectrum management processes have been able to cope, partly due to strong
military influence and partly due to the level of cooperation among the major
interests. The problem that remains is, that as the military eats up more
bandwidth, will the private sector and other government agencies allow them
to continue without a strong challenge? Technology's answers are responding
to the operational needs of the military services, and these answers do not
always guarantee that bandwidth requirements will be kept at a minimum. The
potential for conflict exists, and the present spectrum management system is
not designed to function well unless there is a strong spirit of cooperation.
VI. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FORMULATION
It is clear from the previous portions of this study that the Armed Forces
have gained significant influence in the allocation and assignment processes,
and as a result they have received much of the available spectrum. This can
be attributed not only to our national priorities, but also to the fact that the
communications needs of the respective services were the catalysts for many
of the breakthroughs in electronic communications. Comparatively, the DoD
is in an enviable position regarding the amount of spectrum space assigned.
This does not mean that it is unnecessary to develop a coordinated strategy
regarding the present use and future plans for the spectrum. In fact nothing
could be further from the truth. As the principal recipient of the Federal Gov-
ernment's spectrum resources, the services have the most to lose. Increased
crowding in certain bands will naturally cause other users to evaluate alter-
native regions of the spectrum, and this makes the Armed Forces primary
targets of users desiring greater amounts of spectrum space.
While the NTIA approved over 86.000 specific frequency assignment re-
quests in 1988 [Ref. 23] and they acknowledge that national spectrum man-
agement is one of their primary responsibilities, they do not have a well
articulated set of objectives on what they hope to achieve in spectrum effi-
ciency or utilization. In NTIA Telecom 2000, their 1988 long range look at im-
portant telecommunications issues, spectrum management was relegated to a
seven page appendix at the end of a report that was nearly 700 pages. It may
well be that the size of the task is so vast that they are hesitant to commit re-
sources to it. or that they perceive the risk associated with not having a strat-
egy as low enough to be acceptable. The Armed Forces cannot afford to
accept that risk. The electronic environment in which they operate demands
that they have an articulated strategy that will support national security and
treaty commitments.
This chapter will address both the process for formulating an effective
spectrum management strategy for the military services and the most effective
options that exist. The thrust of this strategy will be to support the joint needs
of all the service components, therefore the terms Armed Forces strategy, DoD
strategy, and joint service strategy will be used interchangeably.
A. DEFINITION OF STRATEGY
To construct a coherent strategy, first there must be a clear understanding
of what strategy is. Especially in the military environment, there is a great
degree of confusion over what constitutes strategy versus what constitutes
tactics. James Brian Ouinn has defined a strategy to be:
...the pattern or plan that integrate's an organization's major goals, policies, and
action sequences into a coherent whole. A well-formulated strategy helps to
marshall and allocate an organization's resources into a unique and viable pos-
tures based on its relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated
changes in the environment, and contingent moves by intelligent opponents. [Ref.
35]
This differs from tactics in that tactics tend to emphasize a more adaptive re-
sponse in an action-reaction type of situation. Strategy is focussed on long
term achievement of organizational objectives.
B. STRATEGIC GOALS
Once there is a clear understanding of what a strategy is, this leads di-
rectly to the question: What are the strategic goals and objectives of the
Armed Forces as they concern the management of spectrum resources? This
can best be understood by looking at the functions and the systems that must
be supported. These include:
• Command and control over all forces. This Includes everything from
hand-held tranceivers used by foot soldiers to hardened command links
that communicate with strategic forces.
• Weapons control systems. These include a variety of radars, voice and
data links.
• Active and passive surveillance systems.
• Electronic navigation systems. [Ref. 35: p. 17.3.1]
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Translating these into spectrum management objectives becomes an exercise
in technical as well as administrative expertise. The technical concerns are
associated with ensuring the electromagnetic compatibility of existing systems
with proposed systems, and with developing new technological answers to
improve utilization of assigned bandwidths. The administrative part of this is
not so straightforward. It involves the translation of engineering and opera-
tional requirements into new frequency assignments. It also means the pro-
tection of existing assignments from encroachment by other users. It also
means working to guarantee that bands that are currently not in demand are
structured for flexibility for future use [Ref. 36: p. 17.3.3].
A final preliminary step in the formulation of any strategy is the assess-
ment of the risk involved and the consequences of a failure to pursue the cor-
rect strategy. For the DoD, the consequences relating to the failure to
adequately protect spectrum resources can be summarized as follows:
• The potential for accelerated obsolescence of existing equipment.
• Limitations on the range of communications systems that can impact on
the geographic deployment of forces.
• Increasing costs of electronic communications equipment. If spectrum
rights are not adequately protected, there will be additional costs incurred
to replace obsolete systems and to keep system perfomance at acceptable
levels in an incompatible environment.
• The performance of surveillance and weapons systems that rely on the
radio frequency spectrum could be significantly degraded.
• Increased interference will create chaos in communication and data links.
[Ref. 36: p. 17.3.1]
To meet its responsibilities and commitments, the services must have elec-
tronic communications capabilities that are secure, jam-resistant, covert, and
available under all conditions.
C. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The formulation of any strategy must include an assessment of the envi-
ronmental factors that influence the system. Having already looked at the
internal environment in addressing the current regulatory structure for the
Federal Government, we must look at those factors external to the system that
can Influence spectrum management issues. In discussing these outside
forces, it is impossible to formulate an effective strategy without looking at
international developments in spectrum management. This appears to be the
principal threat to DoD spectrum resources.
Historically, technical factors were the primary consideration in interna-
tional allocation decisions. At the most recent World Administrative Radio
Conference (WARC) this ceased to be true. Many nations are now challenging
the traditional means of allocating frequencies and are advancing non-
technical criteria to use along with technical concerns in making decisions.
Lesser developed nations have used their voting strength in the international
arena of the ITU to improve their respective positions regarding spectrum re-
sources. In the late 1970's. there was considerable concern in preparing for
WARC 79 that the United States could face a serious threat to "reliable spec-
trum management and the prospect of inadequate allocations for US require-
ments" [Ref. 37: p. 313].
While the United States came away from WARC without significant dam-
age, areas of concern emerged that must be addressed in the DoD strategy.
• The lesser developed countries are heavily dependent on the HF portion
of the spectrum, and they are competing directly with U.S. military needs
in this band. This is complicated by a decrease in utilization of this fre-
quency band by the services.
• Developing nations are increasingly obsessed with obtaining allocations
in bands that they cannot presently exploit in an effort to guarantee them
some spectrum space in the higher bands.
• Many countries refuse to recognize or appreciate the requirements and
investments in advanced systems, specifically U.S. military radar, and are
competing against these systems for spectrum space. [Refs. 38.29]
In the international environment, there has been an exponential growth in the
number of competitors for spectrum resources, and the power of the develop-
ing countries in the ITU forum cannot be dismissed. Unfortunately, a WARC
only occurs once every twenty years. Many of the actual changes are consid-
ered in smaller meetings that take place during the intervening periods. It is
imperative that the United States maintain a high level of concern at the in-
terim meetings in order to protect thes vital resources. Unfortunately, this has
not happened. Senator Harrison Schmitt said in a 1982 speech that
US approaches that rely on our technical expertise and ad hoc policy develop-
ment will eventually ensure that the US will end up in the loser column. [Ref. 39]
The DoD must adopt an aggressive strategy in pursuing US requirements in
the international arena, and must solicit the support of our allies to guarantee
that exisiting systems are not adversely affected and that sufficient flexibility
is built in for future systems.
D. COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS
In the national spectrum management process and in the ability to impact
on U.S. positions in international conferences, the Armed Forces have been
able to greatly affect the specturm resources allocated for their needs. It has
long been contended that the military has an inordinate amount of influence
on the IRAC, and between that body and the MCEB, the miltary has created a
permanent infrastructure that is capable of making existing processes work to
its advantage. It is interesting to note that, in an era when DoD is placing a
greater emphasis on the services planning and executing joint service oper-
ations, the individual service components still represent their own interests on
the IRAC and that the DoD does not have any direct representation on the
committee.
A second factor that relates to the relative strength of the services in the
national spectrum management process is the recognition of the level of in-
vestment by the Armed Forces in electronic communications. One estimate
at the beginning of this decade placed the level of annual investment at over
$10 billion [Ref. 36: p. 17.3.1]. Clearly at the national level, this makes the DoD
by far the heaviest investor in these systems and has further added to their
ability to influence the processes in their favor.
E. COMPARATIVE WEAKNESSES
Relative to their competitors in the Federal Government, the Armed Forces
do not show any comparative weaknesses. They have been weak, though, in
creating changes to the existing system that would increase flexibility. A spe-
cific example of this is the congestion in th UHF band. With the increases in
land mobile, mobile satellite, and fixed satellite communications, there has
been an increasing demand for space in the UHF band. Repeated attempts
have been unsuccessful in reassigning bandwidth that is currently allocated
for UHF television [Ref. 36: p. 17.3.3]. This weakness is more a result of the
inability of the current allocation scheme to be responsive to the changing
needs of the users, but it is a limitation that the services must contend with in
competing for spectrum.
A second weakness of the national spectrum management system which
adversely impacts the DoD is that the division of responsibilities among vari-
ous agencies which manage the spectrum creates problems in defining na-
tional goals when preparing for international conferences. For the last WARC,
there were ten separate committees and working groups organized to consider
and prepare U.S. proposals, options and alternatives. Six of these groups
dealt with the space WARC [Ref. 37: p. 314]. This makes it extremely difficult
to establish clear policy objectives that will translate into proposals. The dif-
ferent groups reflect different users and each one has its own set of priorities.
F. PROPOSED STRATEGY
The historical development of national spectrum management was strongly
influenced by the military, with that influence being especially pronounced
since the beginnning of World War II. The ability of the military services to use
the existing regulations to best advantage was a function of both the Govern-
ment's recognition of its national security needs and the services' ability to
establish an effective infrastructure that provided the technical and adminis-
trative talents needed.
All this has made the DoD the number one "owner" of spectrum space
within the Federal Government, and strategy becomes more a problem of
maintaining the influence and control that one has over the system and not
one of taking any radical departure from the present course. It is clearly in the
best interests of the services that they maintain the degree of influence that
they have on the IRAC. As the principal body involved with the day to day
management of the spectrum, the IRAC will continue to be a powerful
committee.
The MCEB must continue to serve as a focal point for the services to re-
solve electromagnetic compatibility problems. Internal resolution of these
problems limits the influence of other government agencies on bandwidth that
is currently assigned to or is needed by the Armed Forces. The MCEB also
acts as a joint service body of experts to investigate and validate the need for
additional spectrum space. This helps to ensure that spectrum requirements
are amply justified.
What emerges in the final analysis is that the Armed Forces are best
served if the existing system of allocation and assignment remains in place.
There still remains a problem of increasing flexibility in the process to
accomodate the rapidly changing requirements of the services. The strategy
must encompass policy, procedures and systems.
The DoD musi work with other agencies to articulate a more specific policy
for the management of the radio frequency spectrum. This policy must weigh
current demand and projected changes in an attempt to determine the future
availability of spectrum resources. This effort must be conducted jointly by
Government and non-Government users to provide greater focus on potential
problems and some guidance to the research scientists, whose work may
provide some relief through advances in technology. This policy should also
serve as the foundation for the development of U.S. proposals and positions
at international conferences. In 1979, the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment concluded that there must be fundamental changes in the making
of policy or the long term international telecommunications interests would be
at risk [Ref. 40]. Only through the development of overall policy objectives can
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the U.S. hope to compete successfully in the increasingly political ITU
environment.
The joint service strategy must encourage procedural changes that will
improve utilization of the spectrum. This means that the shift from wide band
voice systems to rugged, low rate data communications should continue. The
emphasis on the transmission of data instead of voice can result in significant
savings in bandwidth. A second procedural recommendation is to work at
improved utilization in bands where the services have existing assignments
but historically low utilization rates. This will mean an increased emphasis on
transmission in the HF band, which will meet with resistance due to the re-
duction in signal quality. The positive side effect is that increased utilization
in other bands will help reduce the serious congestion problems in the UHF
band.
Finally, the military must look at current and future systems, and continue
to push technology to the limit in providing new and unique ways of increasing
the size of the usable spectrum. A comprehensive look at operational require-
ments and technical possibilities will result in more effective use of the spec-
trum. This includes a continuing evaluation of the advances in terrestrial
bandwidth (e.g.. fiber optic cable) that can serve as substitutes for the radio
frequency spectrum. A periodic assessment of these advances will support a
better decision process when new systems are considered to meet the ever-
changing roles and responsibilities of the services.
This emphasis on policy, procedures and systems within the existing na-
tional spectrum management regulatory framework is the Armed Forces' best
strategy to ensure that the spectrum resources they need to meet their opera-
tional commitments will be allocated and assigned.
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